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Abstract 
 
This article is a qualitative analysis of the Lisbon Treaty and its institutional and political implications for the 
international political identity of the European Union as a global actor. The Lisbon Treaty makes an 
institutional-political effort for integration of the European foreign policy capacities, followed by installation 
of the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy institutions. This Treaty also constitutes the single legal personality of the EU which differs 
for the EU on the international political scene in relation to others. With the integration of the EU’s foreign 
policy capacities and the fusion of the (former) three pillars, the Lisbon Treaty makes some sort of 
rationalization of the institutions in terms of providing efficient and simplified decision-making, suitable for 
implementing a coherent foreign policy. Thus, considering the prerogatives and credentials of 
aforementioned institutions, regarding their contribution to the international political identity of the EU and 
its decision-making, we conclude that the Lisbon Treaty does not represent a finalité politique of the EU 
integration process, but just a step towards its achievement.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Lisbon Treaty is the last implemented constitutive treaty of the European Union 
(EU; the Union). Its normative and political intention arises from the necessity to 
consolidate the democratic deficit and the crisis of the EU’s political / international political 
identity, after the failure of the Treaty to establish a Constitution for Europe. This situation 
opened many questions concerning how the European Union will be further developed and 
whether it will be able to constitute as a political union (federation in particular) with an 
international political identity as a global actor. Considering this, the present article aims to 
explore the Lisbon Treaty stipulations within the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), and the Treaty’s capacity for establishing the EU’s international political identity. 
In this sense, the main intention of this article is to determine whether the provisions of the 
Lisbon Treaty within the CFSP are finalité politique or just a step towards establishing the 
EU’s international political identity. Otherwise, this article is a qualitative analysis of the 
Lisbon Treaty and its institutional and political implications for the EU’s identity as a 
global actor. This research uses the content analysis method, seeking to answer the 
following research question: what is the place of the Lisbon Treaty within the integration 
process with regards to the identity of the European Union as a global actor? 
 
DEFINING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL IDENTITY 
 
The difficulties of defining the international political identity of the European Union 
(EU) come not only from the complexity of its specific nature, but also from the complexity 
and specificity of this term. Identity in general implies the existence of autonomy, 
distinctiveness and divergence of one political entity in relation to another or other 
homogenous and heterogeneous political entities / actors. In addition, the theorist Heinrich 
Schneider argues, “anyone in search of her or his identity will pose the question: ‘Who am 
I?’ With regard to collective identity the questions are: ‘Who are we? Where do we come 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy from? Where do 
we go? What do we expect? What will expect us?’ But these questions really serve to 
clarify another, more fundamental one: Why and how can we (or must we) talk in the first 
person plural?” (Jansen 1999, 34). Namely, the politics of identity refers to a set of ideas 
and values in one political community, used to induce a state of cohesion and solidarity as 
precondition for building a political / international political identity. Concerning the Union, 
its role in the “international system has always been a central part of the European 
integration process and continuous efforts have been made to enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the Union’s external action” (Wessels and Bopp 2008, 1), directed towards the 
establishment of the EU’s international political identity as a global actor. Thus, “the 
provisions for CFSP and, increasingly also the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), can be regarded as the cornerstone of the Lisbon Treaty” (Wessels and Bopp 
2008). Accordingly, the former British politician Malcolm Rifkind, adds: “consultation and 
co - operation [within the EU] are now instinctive (…) Thus, the foreign policy cooperation 
between EU Member States could be interpreted as the beginnings of a learning process 
where the actors involved increasingly perceive themselves as a ‘We’” (Aggestam 1999). 
Considering that, the EU “does not yet have the single coherent world vision, the deep - 
rooted instincts of a national foreign policy.  
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That is not to the discredit of the European Union. But it is one more reason why we 
should see [the CFSP] as a complement to our national foreign policies, an increasingly 
robust complement, but not a replacement” (Aggestam, 1999). Consequently, Prof. 
Radovan Vukadinovic and Prof. Lidija Cehulic emphasized that: 
[International political identity of the EU is] a set of governmental policies 
that politically harmonized by the Member States, create international 
political position of the [Union] or its international political identity in the 
role of distinctive and unique international political entity [actor] on the 
international political scene (Vukadinovic and Cehulic 2005, 118).  
 
This definition significantly connects the EU’s international political identity with 
the role of the EU on the international political scene as an actor. Consequently, Prof. 
Vukadinovic projects the actorness of the EU through its international activity, rather than 
its institutional appearance. Concerning the actorness, the theorists Charlotte Bretherton 
and John Vogler, stipulate four basic requirements of this phenomenon, as follows: 
1. Shared commitment to a set of overarching values, 
2. Domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to 
external policy, 
3. The ability to identify priorities and formulate policies – captured by the 
concepts of consistency and coherency, where: 
a. Consistency indicates the degree of congruence between the external 
policies of the Member states and of the EU  
b. Coherence refers to the level of internal coordination of EU policies, and 
4. The availability of and the capacity to utilize policy instruments – 
diplomacy, negotiation, economic tools and military means (Bretherton and 
Vogler 1999, 30). 
 
Concerning the Lisbon Treaty, it prescribed the axiological (value) framework of 
the EU, which requires the Union and the Member States to affirm and to respect its values. 
Starting from that, the axiological framework of the European Union generally 
encompasses freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
the rule of law. In that context, Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty proclaims that: 
 The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law (The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 28). 
 
Through the promotion of these values, the Union determines its course in the 
direction of developing and building partnerships with third countries and other 
international, regional or global organizations. The Union therefore initiates itself as a 
major promoter of multilateralism, of course in accordance with the principles of 
international justice within the historical process of promotion, prevention and protection of 
the fundamental values of humanity, such as democracy, human rights and freedom, human 
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dignity, and global peace. The Union also, in accordance with Article 21(2) of the Lisbon 
Treaty, draws its missionary and proactive international role, in order to:  
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and 
integrity; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and the principles of international law; (c) preserve peace, prevent 
conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter (…) promote an 
international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good 
global governance (The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 28-29). 
 
Despite the axiological framework of the EU, coherence appears as a key issue 
regarding the establishment of international political identity, and thus, the capacity of 
actorness. In that sense, the theorists Joseph Jupille and James A. Caporaso claims that 
coherence determines whether or not an entity is an actor, because“[t]o be an actor implies 
a minimal level of cohesion” (Keisala 2004, 84). In that context, we must emphasize that 
only the states and other forms of political unions similar to them (federation or 
confederation), naturally possess the coherence understood in stricto sensu. Based on this 
view, the EU actorness is quite problematic to define, as the EU often (incoherently) 
reflects the political views of its Member States, and thus sometimes appearing as an 
international organization, and while other times as a state. In order to define more 
accurately the phenomenon of cohesion, the theorists Joseph Jupille and James A. Caporaso 
noted four different dimensions. 
The first dimension is value cohesion, which owns inclusive and integrative 
function, and which “refers to the similarity and compatibility of basic goals” (Keisala 
2004, 84). As the second dimension, Jupille and Caporaso noted tactical cohesion, which 
appears in conditions of disharmonious political views of the Member States within the EU 
“if goals are different but can be made to fit one another” (Keisala 2004). The third 
dimension is procedural cohesion, which “implies some consensus on rules and procedures 
used to process those issues where conflict arises and, thus, agreement on basic rules by 
which policies are made” (Keisala 2004). The fourth dimension is output cohesion, which 
refers to the situation where the Member States of the EU succeed in formulating policies 
regardless of the level of substantive or procedural agreement (Keisala 2004). The latter 
dimension directly implies the ability to articulate foreign policy, which is to provide a 
unique appearance in the international relations of the particular entity - the EU in this case. 
Similarly, the significance of this dimension emphasizes the inability of the EU to achieve 
consistent articulation of a single foreign policy, because of the different political views and 
preferences of its Member States in certain situations and under certain circumstances. 
On that basis, we conclude another dimension of coherence, the coherence of 
preferences, directly connected with the ability of the Union (and the Member States) to 
establish a common foreign policy based on setting up transcendental objectives and goals. 
This dimension refers to where, when and how to act, primarily taking into account the EU 
interests as a whole, not in fragmentary pieces. Consequently, the EU leaders must work 
together, in order “to increase [the EU] cohesiveness (...) [And thus to] provide the EU with 
a distinctive [international political] identity” (Grajauskas 2011). In that favour, the Lisbon 
Treaty installed the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the “High Representative”), in order to 
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provide a minimum opportunity for enhancing the coherence, and thus, to invest in the 
building of the EU’s international political identity. Both institutions need to synchronize 
the Member States political views in order to bring them in line with the interests and the 
views of the European Union as a whole. As in the previous treaties, the Lisbon Treaty 
stresses the mutual commitment of Member States to support the EU’s foreign and security 
policy “actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” and to 
“refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair 
its effectiveness” (Wessels and Bopp 2008, 12), thus “specifying the general assurance of 
mutual cooperation and fulfilment of treaty obligations” (Wessels and Bopp 2008).   
 
INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DETERMINATIONS 
 
With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU obliged itself to become a 
more democratic and transparent, more efficient, and more just (taking into account rights 
and values, freedom, solidarity and security) and to establish itself as an actor on the global 
stage with its own distinct and authentic international political identity (The Treaty at a 
glance 2009). In that context, this Treaty provides adequate institutional and political 
determinations, as follows: 
1. A new President of the European Council with fixed mandate, projected to 
maintain the political stability and continuity of the EU; 
2. A new High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy Vice-President of the Commission will increase the impact, coherence 
and visibility of the EU's external action; 
3. A new European External Action Service will provide back up and support to 
the High Representative; 
4. A single legal personality for the Union will strengthen the Union's 
negotiating power, making it more effective on the world stage and a more 
visible partner for third countries and international organisations; and 
5. Progress in European Security and Defence Policy will preserve special 
decision-making arrangements but also pave the way towards reinforced 
cooperation amongst a smaller group of Member States (The Treaty at a 
glance 2009). 
  
By installing the institution of the “President of the European Council”, a fixed 
independent and individual body with a mandate of at least two and a half years and 
representative prerogatives in conducting the foreign policy have been finally 
institutionalized. This institution has extraordinary significance in foreign policy and the 
representation of the EU in international relations. Regarding that, the European Council 
(EC) as an institution aims to “identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the 
objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, 
including for matters with defence implications” (The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 32). 
Accordingly, Article 15(5) of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that: “the European 
Council shall elect its President, by a qualified majority, for a term of two and a half years, 
renewable once. In the event of an impediment or serious misconduct, the European 
Council can end the President’s term of office in accordance with the same procedure” (The 
Lisbon Treaty 2010, 23). In that regard, the President of the European Council: 
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1. shall chair the European Council and drive forward its work;  
2. shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European 
Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the 
basis of the work of the General Affairs Council;  
3. shall endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European 
Council;  
4. shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of 
the European Council (The Lisbon Treaty 2010). 
 
The functioning of this institution aims at providing not only a harmonious and 
coordinated definition of the strategic and general political guidelines of the EU, but also 
aims at stimulating effectuation of a coherent and representative implementation of 
common international political activities within the EU. Within its framework, the 
President of the European Council simultaneously appears as a President of the European 
Council as well as of a kind of spokesperson of the Union in international relations. In that 
context, there are two diametrically opposed viewpoints, where the first one treats the 
President of the European Council as an institution with its coordinating and representative 
functions, while the other treats him as a strong representative of the Union in international 
relations, in the role of a “President of Europe”. The latter viewpoint is particularly 
characteristic of European federalists and their efforts for transforming the EU into a 
political union, i.e. into a democratic federation. In addition, the President of the European 
Council is responsible for submitting a regular report of his work to the European 
Parliament and for consulting with the President of the European Commission. The 
necessity for cooperation with the President of Commission is anticipated because the 
European Commission is obliged by Article 17(1) to “promote the general interest of the 
Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end” (The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 25).  
This inter-institutional cooperation emerges as an inherent consequence of the need 
for a coherent, consistent and organized action within the CFSP framework. In addition, 
Article 15(6) stipulates that the President of the European Council “shall, at his level and in 
that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its 
common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” (The Lisbon Treaty 
2010, 23). According to the Treaty, the High Representative is in charge of organizing and 
coordinating the work of the Union as regards the CFSP and representing the Union in 
international relations. This institution is created by fusion of the previous institutions: 
European Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood Policy and High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. The purpose of this fusion and 
rationalization is the fulfilment of the institutional - political conditions for creating an 
effective EU Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a single common representation of the Union 
in international relations. Otherwise, what can be said for this institution is that it is a 
nominally reformed counterpart of the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the EU, 
provided by the “failed” European Constitution. In this respect, the European Council 
“acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, 
shall appoint the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” 
as is stated in Article 18(1) of the Lisbon Treaty (The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 26). The 
significance of this institution is tremendous because the High Representative of the Union 
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is also responsible for conducting the CFSP as well as the Common Security and Defence 
Policy. Also, the Treaty has fused the function of the High Representative with that of the 
Commissioner for External Relations. A solid and monolithic coordination and 
organization of the international political activities of the Union is to be provided through 
this fusion of institutions and functions. In that context, the High Representative is 
predicted to preside with the Foreign Affairs Council, and also to take over the role of one 
of the Vice-presidents of the European Commission, as an institution responsible for setting 
the general political direction and the international political representativeness of the EU. In 
that respect, the High Representative is obliged to promote and ensure consensus among the 
Member States of the Union, and at the same time to include the different political interests 
of the Member States in creating the CFSP. With that in mind, the High Representative will 
need to make efforts for ensuring consistency in the international political activities of the 
Union, since he is the one who is responsible “within the Commission for responsibilities 
incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s 
external action” (The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 27). By the effectuation of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
High Representative is enabled to be “pervasive” in the overall work of its institutions in 
the field of foreign policy. Or, as provided by the Treaty: “the High Representative shall 
conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy. He shall contribute by his 
proposals to the development of that policy (...) the same shall apply to the common 
security and defence policy” (The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 26). In that sense, the High 
Representative is authorized to perform a representative function, or as is stated in the 
Article 27(2):  
The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the 
common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue 
with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s 
position in international organisations and at international conferences (The 
Lisbon Treaty 2010, 32).  
 
According to that, the High Representative is responsible both for coordinating the 
international political activities of the Member States on the international political scene 
and for representing the EU in international relations. Through this provision of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the institution of the High Representative is even more geared towards intensifying 
the coherence of the Union in its international political activities. In that context, an 
interesting novelty stipulated in this Treaty, by which the position and the role of the High 
Representative have been reinforced, is the instalment of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) as a kind of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This service is intended to 
reinforce the functionality and efficiency of the High Representative in terms of expertise 
and competence in performance of tasks. It is planned to initiate the organization and the 
functioning of the EEAS by a decision of the European Council. It is provided for the 
Council to adopt such a decision, but “the Council shall act on a proposal from the High 
Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of 
the Commission” (The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 32). It is also stipulated, in Article 27(3) that: 
“the [EEAS] shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States 
and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the 
Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services 
of the Member States” (The Lisbon Treaty 2010).  
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In that context, the High Representative will coordinate the diplomatic missions of 
the Member States of the Union and their delegations in third countries, as well as provide 
stimulation of the enhanced cooperation among the Member States in the interest of 
effectuating the common international political activities on the international political 
scene. From the essence of the stipulated provision one can elicit the “hybrid” (CEPS et al. 
2007) nature of the EEAS, as semi-supranational and semi-intergovernmental agency sui 
generis, whose more detailed organization will depend on the decision made by the 
Council. Together with that, the Lisbon Treaty as another innovation has established the 
European Defence Agency (EDA), which has an identical, hybrid nature like the EEAS. 
The European Defence Agency has been established “by a joint action of the Council of 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Union in 2004 for the first time” (Wessels and Bopp 
2008, 29). According to that, it has been stipulated in Article 42(3) that this Agency is 
going to work in favour of “defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and 
armaments” (The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 38), as an area that in the future should be developed 
within the framework of the Union. In that context, Article 42(3) stipulates that the EDA 
shall identify operational requirements of the Union and, for this purpose, it shall: 
[P]romote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to 
identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to 
strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall 
participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and 
shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military 
capabilities (The Lisbon Treaty 2010). 
 
Thus, the tasks of the EDA are stipulated in Article 45(1) of the Lisbon Treaty, in 
which it is provided that by its constitution the EDA shall have as its task to: 
1. contribute to identifying the Member States’ military capability objectives 
and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the 
Member States;  
2. promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, 
compatible procurement methods;  
3. propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military 
capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the 
Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;  
4. support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research 
activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational 
needs;   
5. contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure 
for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector 
and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure (The Lisbon 
Treaty 2010, 40). 
 
In accordance with these provisions, efforts have been made for creating an 
institution that will possess the capacity to perform mobilization of the (national) military 
resources of the Member States as well as of the Union, if it has its own autonomous 
military assets. Decisions concerning the CFSP and CSDP will be made unanimously by 
the Council, on a proposal of the High Representative or on the initiative of a Member State 
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of the Union. According to that, efforts are made through the Lisbon Treaty for “imposing” 
the leading role of the High Representative in this area as well, as an essential connection 
between the EDA and the European Council, as a basis for providing a solid and 
institutional communication between them.  
Namely, what is especially important in the security and defence area of the Union 
is the position and the role of the Council, as an important authority and political supervisor 
of the work of the EDA. The EDA is planned to be an agency available to all Member 
States that are willing to be part of it. In that context, the Council will make a decision for 
defining its statute and the operational rules for its functioning by a qualified majority. 
Such a decision must be previously based on the effectiveness of the Member States 
participation in the activities of the Agency. For this purpose special working groups will 
be formed that will be responsible for enabling the joint operations of the Member States as 
well as their effectiveness in creating the joint projects of the Union in the security and 
defence arena. 
In addition, the Lisbon Treaty plans other flexible mechanisms for Member States’ 
participation in this area. That is, the establishment of a Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PSC) as a flexible mechanism for co-opted participation of the Member States in the 
Union area of defence, according to their military readiness to participate in such a 
structure. In general, “these flexibility provisions for the area of CFSP foreseen in the 
Lisbon Treaty are more transparent both for participating and non-participating members so 
that the creation” (Wessels and Bopp 2008, 27) of a “‘directoire’ of the big three” (Hill 
2006, 1-7) might be avoided. The opportunities for creating a European mechanism for 
defence, dominated and orchestrated by the military-political and economically powerful 
Member States of the Union will be reduced through the installation of such cooperation. 
According to Article 46(1) of the Lisbon Treaty, it is stipulated that:  
[T]hose Member States which wish to participate in the permanent 
structured cooperation [and] which fulfil the criteria and have made the 
commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent 
structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 40).  
 
In this regard, the Council is going to adopt such proposals for creating the PSC and 
determine a list of participating states, whose role will be proactive in such cooperation. 
Within that framework, each Member State willing to join the PSC in some of its advanced 
phases will be obliged to inform the Council and the High Representative to that effect. 
Admission to the PSC will be determined by a Council Decision, adopted by a qualified 
majority and consent of the High Representative of the Union. The Lisbon Treaty also 
regulates the right of vote of the Member States within the PSC framework. According to 
Article 46(4): “Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States, 
with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the vote” (The Lisbon 
Treaty 2010, 41). Similarly, the obligation of the Member States, in case of a military threat 
from a third party, is clearly stated. In that regard, Article 42(7) stipulated that: “if a 
Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States 
shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power” 
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(The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 39). In fulfilling their obligations, the Member States undertake 
to respect the appropriate procedure under the solidarity clause by this Treaty.  
Namely, Article 43(2) states that the Council: 
shall adopt decisions relating to the [particular] tasks [such as peace-
keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in 
accordance with the principles of the UN Charter] defining their objectives 
and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting 
under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the 
Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian 
and military aspects of such tasks (The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 39).  
 
Those Member States, in cooperation with the High Representative, will agree on 
the organization and the conditions for fulfilling the tasks. At the same time, the “Member 
States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on 
their own initiative or at the request of another Member State” (The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 
40). In that direction, those Member States: 
shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task 
entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and 
conditions determined for the task [such as peace-keeping, conflict 
prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter]. In such cases, the Council shall 
adopt the necessary decisions (The Lisbon Treaty 2010, 40). 
 
Within the framework of accomplishing the aforementioned tasks, the High 
Representative is re-emerging again as a leading actor, following the recommendations 
given by the European Council. Accordingly, the High Representative has the authority for 
coordinating the implementation of the policies in this area. In addition to that, the 
identification of the legal personality of the Union has been finally made by the Lisbon 
Treaty, which is a step towards transforming it into a single international legal entity, with 
its own specifics and autonomous international political identity. It is about a quality 
(characteristic) that helps the Union to appear as a party at the conclusion of international 
treaties with third countries, and thus to collectively enter or withdraw from membership in 
other international organizations or structures, as a single legal and political partner. 
In that context, the former High Representative, Javier Solana would emphasize that 
“the EU’s acquisition of legal personality was ‘not a minor issue’, but that it was ‘important 
politically more than legally’” (Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty 2008, 33). 
Concerning the legal personality of the EU acquired with the Lisbon Treaty, Solana also 
stressed that “it would be easier for third countries to understand the EU without the 
complication of dealing with, and sometimes signing agreements with, different entities” 
(Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty 2008, 33). In addition, a single legal 
personality for the Union will enable the EU to speak and take action as a single and 
distinct entity on the international political scene. Therefore, the importance of the Lisbon 
Treaty as an initial step in the integration process of the Union can be concluded through 
the installation of both the institution of the President of the European Council and the 
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institution of the High Representative, authorized to provide the external coherence and to 
foster solidarity within the EU. Thus, this type of coherence “is somewhat strengthened.  
The Lisbon Treaty indeed made some efforts in order to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness of single institutions, especially by the establishment of the High 
Representative and the full-time presidency of the European Council” (Wessels and Bopp 
2008, 28). 
 
INTEGRATION STAGES 
 
In its institutional and political development, the EU has gone through three major 
integration stages. Each of them is transparently shown on the integration cascade (ladder), 
also known as “ratchet fusion process” (Wessels and Bopp 2008, 6). Otherwise, with 
locating the Lisbon Treaty’s place within the European integration process in mind, we 
have upgraded this “ratchet fusion” with the dashed arrow, presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: “Ratchet fusion”(Source: Wessels and Bopp 2008, 6) 
 
Stages shown on the cascade are directly derived from the legitimization basis of 
the EU, which covers the constitutive treaties that condition its foundation and its 
institutional and political development. This article treats the Lisbon Treaty as the current 
legitimization basis of the EU. Taking into account the “ratchet fusion process”, this would 
mean that the CFSP stipulations of the Lisbon Treaty have provided for:  
A major step upward towards the ‘next plateau’ of an ‘integration ladder’, 
representing a gradual move towards a system with clear supranational 
elements. This would also mean that the often-claimed coherence of the 
Union’s external action and its capability to act have been enhanced towards 
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a stronger and more coherent international actor with a strengthened identity 
in the international system and more capabilities to act while internal 
efficiency and transparency have been enhanced (Wessels and Bopp 2008, 
4).  
 
The first stage (plateau I) covers the primordial political integration of the EU 
member states (then Community) as a basis for creating coherence in their political 
activities, for the purpose of defining and establishing the European international political 
identity. This stage, generated by initiating and formalizing the European political 
cooperation (starting with the report from Luxembourg, to the Single European Act), 
undoubtedly leads to certain progress in terms of political communication and closer 
political cooperation among the EU member states. The significance of such political 
cooperation effectuates a relatively flexible, non-obligatory and voluntary “system” of 
interstate decision making, in the sphere of foreign policy and the ability of the European 
Community / the Union for a coherent creation of international political actions.  According 
to that, the development of the “initial awareness” of the Member States for the importance 
and the necessity of intensive political communication concerning the questions from the 
international political area can be seen as the greatest benefit of this stage. Moreover, all of 
that was aimed toward Europe’s starting to speak with one voice, instead of speaking in a 
choir of voices, as was stipulated in the Declaration for European Identity and the 
Luxemburg Report. 
The second stage (plateau II), began by establishing the institutional - political 
architecture of the Union through the Maastricht Treaty and up to the Treaty of Nice. This 
stage is characterized by the final integration of the “political cooperation” within the 
structures of EU, the installation of the three-pillar system, and commitment for further 
development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as the strengthening of 
intergovernmental decision-making within the area of international activities of the EU. 
This stage is characterized by existence of the predominant intergovernmentalism in 
decision-making process, democratic deficit, military underdevelopment, institutional non-
transparency, strengthening of the bureaucracy, “eurocracy” etc.  
The third stage (plateau III), represented on the integration ladder as a stage of 
finalité politique, has still not been reached from this perspective, despite the Union 
“efforts” to achieve final institutional and political establishment of its international 
political identity as a global actor. This stage involves a final political unification of the 
Union, in which it should be transformed into a political union of a federal type. Within it, 
the Union will have to be able to generate institutional and political architecture, 
compatible with supranational and communitarian concepts (or the “Community method”), 
as well as political expansion and strengthening of the authorities and prerogatives of its 
institutions, with stressed authority (power) in terms of foreign policy. All this implies a 
change in the decision-making process, from a system of unanimity to a (qualified) 
majority system, or another flexible decision-making process concerning the CFSP. 
In that context, we believe that it is important to emphasize that the European 
federalists see extending and fostering as much as possible the Community method in 
various areas of the Union’s activities as the only method for increasing coherence within 
the EU, and as an efficient tool for incremental building of a European democratic 
federation. Namely, the Community method implies “pooling of national sovereignty in 
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certain defined respects and the empowerment of supranational institutions to advance and 
give effect to joint solutions to shared problems” (Duff 2011, 2-16). Thus, the Community 
method should not be confused with the Monnet method, which descriptively speaking 
represents a method of “integration by stealth” (Majone 2009, 13). The theorist 
Giandomenico Majone used the “label ‘crypto-federalism’ to denote a type of federalist 
revisionism, characterized by this roundabout approach to the political integration of 
Europe” (Majone 2009, 72). This approach (of which Jean Monnet is a central figure) is 
highly different from the orthodox (Hamiltonian) federalist worldview, mainly recognizable 
through the work of the prominent European federalist Altiero Spinelli. In fact, Monnet 
used the expression “‘United States of Europe’ more as a tribute to the USA, a country he 
knew well and loved, than as a definite ideological commitment” (Majone 2009, 73). This 
method, according to Giandomenico Majone “consists in pursuing political integration, not 
by frankly political means, but under the guise of economic integration” (Majone 2009), 
and it primarily represents a product of “quasi-constitutional principles derived from the 
founding treaties and from neofunctionalism” (Majone 2009). 
Unlike the neofunctionalism, the federalist concept requires the adoption of a 
European constitution as the ultimate democratic asset for establishing a European 
democratic federation. The establishment of such a European democratic federation, 
according to the federalists, will be pursued through a gradual reform of the existing 
constitutive treaty, such as the Lisbon Treaty, or as MEP Andrew Duff stressed, “it is 
obvious that the new European federal constitution will be based largely on the existing EU 
treaties” (Duff 2011, 5). This means that the specific nature of the Union will continue to 
exist, but in enhanced and modified form, which in the future should serve as the 
legitimization basis for its further political / international political modelling. However, 
with the “fall” of the European constitution, the Union was forced to start thinking in an 
alternate direction, in order to find a solution for overcoming the “post-constitutional” 
crisis and thus to intervene in the process of establishing an international political identity 
as a global actor. Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty in its essence represents a quasi-federal 
act, because of its confusing, complex and vague content, and also its partly constitutional 
determination, which is done through a “compromise” with the protagonists and opponents 
of the European federalism, seeking to satisfy both sides, and thus to constitute a distinctive 
type of federalism without a federation. Or, as the famous author Zbigniew Brzezinski says: 
“at best, the European political union would have grown into something less than the 
United States of Europe, and something more than the European Union as a corporation” 
(Brzezinski 2001, 21).  
 
FEATURES OF THE LISBON TREATY 
 
Based on the research question: what is the place of the Lisbon Treaty within the 
integration process with regards to the identity of the European Union as a global actor?, 
we can conclude that the Lisbon Treaty takes a specific, crucial, alternate and at the same 
time an initial place in the third phase of the previous presented integration cascade. Taking 
into account its institutional and political architecture as a complex descendant of the 
European constitution, it openly started to recede regarding the question of creating a 
political union (federation in particular). Therefore, it can be concluded that the Lisbon 
Treaty does not constitute the identity of the Union as a global actor, but only initiated it. 
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The CFSP provisions of the Lisbon Treaty “can thus not be qualified as a ‘saut 
constitutionnel’ in a ‘supranational’ direction” (Wessels and Bopp 2008, 29), but “as a 
major step forward towards the establishment of a growing and strengthened global identity 
of the EU which – despite the complexity of the treaty provisions – has strengthened its 
international identity as an actor (...)” (Wessels and Bopp 2008, 5). In that sense, the Lisbon 
Treaty provisions “can be interpreted as demonstrating an ever-refined type of ‘rationalised 
intergovernmentalism’” (Wessels 2001, 204), “whereby the heads of state and government 
grant limited roles to the EP and the Commission but stick to unanimity in the Council and 
the central role of the European Council” (Wessels and Bopp 2008, 4).  
Furthermore, characteristic of the Lisbon Treaty within the CFSP are indeed the key 
political institutions provided by it, i.e. the President of the European Council and the High 
Representative, as well as the commitments for creating a defence mechanism with a 
specific, sui generis nature (embodied in the PSC and the EDA). By the installation of these 
institutions, this Treaty strives to enable Europe to speak with one voice and with one 
mouth in international affairs as a precondition for its establishment as a global actor. 
However, this attempt has been reduced through “diarchy” or “intrinsic dualism” (Wessels 
and Bopp 2008, 29), because both institutions, as the President of the European Council 
and the High Representative, have been assigned responsibility for representing the Union 
in international relations (Figure 2.). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: “Diarchy” (Source: My own depiction referring to data collected from the Lisbon Treaty) 
 
 
Alongside that, the role of the High Representative is significantly intensified in 
terms of affirmation and promotion of the fundamental values of the Union, inside and 
outside of it in relations with other international actors. At the same time, its role as 
arbitrator and mediator in the process of decision-making in CFSP (and CDSP) has been 
strengthened. In that context, the High Representative is responsible for “accelerating” the 
procedure for harmonization and synchronization of the political views of the Member 
States on one hand, and thus to ensure coherence within the CFSP and the EU’s 
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representation in international affairs. In line with the provisions of the Treaty, the High 
Representative inherits the most difficult role in organizing and coordinating the Member 
States, in order to persuade them to stand united in the name of the European vision and 
interests, and thus together to ensure the establishment of an international political identity 
of the Union. In this regard, the High Representative “will play a role that is not yet clearly 
defined. S/he could behave as an actor representing the overall interests of the Union and 
controlling national foreign policies without any ties to national institutions” (Wessels and 
Bopp 2008, 14). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Lisbon Treaty takes a specific, crucial and at the same time initial position on 
the integration cascade. Speaking to its institutional-political architecture, as a complex 
“descendant” of the “failed” European constitution, the Lisbon Treaty openly started to 
recede regarding the question of transforming the EU into a political union (federation or 
confederation) as finalité politique of European integration and the question of making 
efforts for constituting the identity of the EU as a global actor. Based on that, it can be 
concluded that the international political identity of the Union can only be initiated by the 
Lisbon Treaty and cannot be constituted by it, because this Treaty is not a constitution. The 
initiation of an international political identity of the EU stems from the provisions of the 
Treaty for institutionalization of the institutions such as the President of the European 
Council and the High Representative, authorized to provide the external coherence and to 
foster solidarity within the EU. In accordance with the Treaty, these institutions acquire 
powers and responsibilities that ensure continuous functioning in terms of creating the 
strategic directions of the EU in the area of CFSP and of course powers in terms of 
harmonization of the contradicted international political views of the Member States. The 
principle of unanimous decision-making within the CFSP largely appears as a dominant 
obstacle for constituting an international political identity, which is one more reason for 
preventing the realization of the ultimate goal of the European integration – a unified and 
federal Europe.  
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty is a legal and political document, only responsible for 
initiating and strengthening the EU’s international political identity, because it is not a 
constitution for its content, but a document, which in accordance to the principles of 
unanimity and intergovernmentalism, regulates and coordinates the relations among the 
Member States of the EU. Therefore, it can be said with certainty that this Treaty as a 
document does not legitimize the phase of finalité politique, but rather only represents an 
alternative legal and political document that makes a step forward, towards the process of 
constituting an international political identity of the EU as a global actor. In the future, this 
Treaty must also serve as a legitimization basis for institutional and political upgrading of 
the Union towards its supranationalization. Because only as a political union (federation or 
confederation at least) will the EU be able to establish its international political identity as a 
functional global actor.  
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